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Abstract  
Many environmental problems involve the transformation of multiple harmful substances into 
one or more damage agents much in the same way as a firm transforms inputs into outputs. Yet 
environmental management differs from a firm’s production in one important respect: while a 
firm  seeks  efficient  input  allocation  to  maximize  profit,  an  environmental  planner  allocates 
abatement  efforts  to  render  the  production  of  damage  agents  as  inefficient  as  possible.  We 
characterize a solution to the hmultiple pollutants problem and show that the optimal policy is 
often a corner solution, in which abatement is focused on a single pollutant. Corner solutions may 
arise even in well-behaved problems with concave production functions and convex damage and 
cost  functions.  Furthermore,  even  concentrating  on  a  wrong  pollutant  may  yield  greater  net 
benefits than setting uniform abatement targets for all harmful substances. Our general theoretical 
results on the management of flow and stock pollutants are complemented by two numerical 
examples illustrating the abatement of eutrophying nutrients and greenhouse gases.  
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1. Introduction 
Many of the most serious environmental problems are caused by multiple pollutants that 
interact with each other.
1 Examples include climate change and eutrophication (increased algal 
growth in a water ecosystem): in both cases, several pollutants are transformed into damage 
agents  that  ultimately  cause  the  environmental  problem,  much  in  the  same  way  as  a  firm 
transforms  its  inputs  into  economic  outputs.  Optimal  pollution  control  policy  in  the  case  of 
multiple pollutants requires that the tradeoffs in the abatement and damage costs of different 
pollutants be taken into account. Since economists are particularly good at balancing tradeoffs, 
von Ungern-Sternberg (1987) proposed that economists take a more active role in the decisions 
concerning which pollution emissions should be reduced, and by how much. His concern that 
economists  are  not  consulted  enough  when  setting abatement targets  still  seems  valid  today, 
particularly  in  the  case  of  multiple  pollutants: more  often  than not,  natural scientists set  the 
targets for emission reductions on environmental grounds and economists are then asked to find 
the  ways  to  achieve  the  targets  at  minimum  cost.  As  a  consequence,  the  tradeoffs  between 
multiple pollutants are ignored and emission targets are set at inefficient levels. For example, the 
Helsinki  Convention  has  set  50%  reduction  targets  for  the  emissions  of  both  nitrogen  and 
phosphorus to combat eutrophication in the Baltic Sea region. The reduction targets in the Kyoto 
Protocol are also generally specified as percentage reductions in annual average greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) are used to convert the other GHGs into 
carbon  equivalents,  indicating  that  perfect  substitutability  is  assumed  between  the  different 
GHGs. From an economic point of view, there is no reason to expect that such uniform rates of 
reduction will produce a socially optimal abatement mix.  
                                                 
1 We use the term “pollutant” in a broad sense to refer to any substance or energy that causes harm to the human or 
natural environment.    3 
The  optimal  management  of  multiple,  interacting  pollutants  has  regardless  received 
relatively  short  shrift  in  the  economics  literature.  Endres  (1985)  and  von  Ungern-Sternberg 
(1987)  provided  theoretical  analyses  of  the  problem  in  a  static  framework.  Repetto  (1987) 
considered the case where nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons react to form atmospheric ozone, 
and Elofsson (2006) and Sarang et al. (2008) accounted for the interdependence of nitrogen and 
phosphorus in the production of damage linked to excessive algal growth; these analyses were 
also confined to a static setting. In a dynamic context, multigas mitigation has received attention 
primarily in the economic analysis of climate change, but few papers have addressed the optimal 
abatement mix within a cost-benefit framework that accounts for both environmental damage and 
abatement costs. The analytical articles by Kandlikar (1995) and Hammitt et al. (1996) focused 
on determining economically sound indices for describing the relative role of different GHGs in 
an abatement policy. Hoel and Isaksen (1994) studied a damage-based index for different GHGs 
within an optimal control model and showed that the weights of the various gases depend on 
assumptions underlying the economic model applied and that many of the weights change over 
time. Tol (1999) calculated the global damage potential of a number of GHGs in light of the 
vulnerability  of  various  sectors  of  the  economy.  The  interdependence  of  the  problems  of 
tropospheric  ozone  and  acidification  has  been  addressed  by  Schmieman  et  al.  (2002),  who 
conducted a dynamic cost-benefit analysis to determine the paths for three different pollutants. 
Most recently, Moslener and Requate (2007) provided a more general analysis of the dynamic 
properties of optimal joint abatement paths for multiple accumulating pollutants that interact with 
respect to environmental damage.  
Despite the rising interest in multipollutant problems, the question of whether it is more 
efficient  to  reduce  emissions  of  all  pollutants  or  to  focus  efforts  on  one  limiting  factor  has 
received little attention since von Ungern-Sternberg’s static study. We claim that one reason why   4 
economic  tradeoffs  have  remained  underrepresented  in  formulating  real-world  multipollutant 
environmental policy may lie in the stylized models often used in theoretical economic analyses 
of  pollution  abatement.  Much  of  environmental  economics  literature  has  focused  on  models 
involving  a  single  pollutant.  Where  multiple  pollutants  have  been  accounted  for,  dynamic 
analyses in particular have for the sake of analytical convenience focused on interior solutions..  
This  paper  considers  the  dynamic  properties  of  efficient  multi-pollutant  abatement 
strategies, focusing in particular on whether it is more efficient to abate all of the interacting 
pollutants, or focus all abatement effort on one pollutant. It contributes to the existing literature as 
follows. Firstly, it adds to the first dynamic multipollutant analysis by Moslener and Requate 
(2007) by explicitly accounting for the possibility of corner solutions, and by allowing for non-
separability of both damage and abatement costs in the multiple pollutants. Secondly, differing 
from Endres’ (1985) pioneering work, the present paper discusses multiple reasons for corner 
solutions. It acknowledges that corner solutions may arise because a realistic description of the 
problem at hand requires employing non-differentiable damage or abatement cost functions. It 
characterizes conditions under which corner solutions may also arise with perfectly well-behaved 
convex damage and abatement cost functions. Thirdly, differing from the analyses by Endres 
(1985) and von Ungern-Sternberg (1987), both the optimal levels of both environmental quality 
and abatement expenditure are endogenously determined within the model. Finally, the paper 
provides a step towards applications through empirical examples based on two of today’s major 
environmental concerns: eutrophication and climate change. In particular, we show that it may be 
optimal to abate only one of the pollutants in each period, and that the pollutant that abatement 
effort  should  focus  on  may  change  from  one  period  to  another  along  the  optimal  dynamic 
abatement path.    5 
This paper approaches the problem of environmental management in the case of multiple, 
accumulating pollutants from the perspective of the theory of the firm. This field has a long 
tradition  in  dealing  with  multiple  inputs  (and,  increasingly,  with  multiple  outputs)  and  can 
provide  useful  insights  for  understanding  cases  involving  multiple  pollutants.  Environmental 
management  differs  from  production  in  a  firm  in  one  important  respect:  while  a  firm  seeks 
efficient  input  allocations  that  maximize  profit,  an  environmental  planner  applies  abatement 
measures to render the production of damage agents as inefficient as possible and thus minimize 
environmental damage. Under the standard regularity conditions, profit is maximized when the 
marginal rates of substitution between different inputs are equal. If the technologies that produce 
environmental damage obey the same regularity conditions as firms’ production technologies, the 
minimization of damage will lead to a corner solution in which the abatement efforts focus on a 
single factor that limits production. Thus, corner solutions may arise even in problems satisfying 
the standard regularity conditions of concave production and convex damage and cost functions. 
We show that this important lesson applies to many problems in environmental management and 
is fairly robust to uncertainty about parameter values. The results also indicate that the optimal 
abatement mix may change over time. Furthermore, concentrating on a wrong pollutant may 
yield greater net benefits to society than setting uniform abatement targets for all pollutants. In 
sum, recognition of the possibility of corner solutions is important for policy formulation. While 
corner solutions may be analytically cumbersome, models that from the outset only allow for 
interior solutions can be misleading in the case of many environmental problems.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the parallels between a 
firm’s production decision and an environmental planner’s abatement decision in the case of flow 
pollutants. This analysis is then generalized to the case of stock pollutants in section 3, and some   6 
interesting  special  cases  are  examined.  Section  4  presents  two  empirical  illustrations.  The 
concluding section summarizes the insights gained for the management of multiple pollutants.  
 
2. Efficient multipollutant abatement policy: flow pollutants  
We  first  consider  the  optimal  multipollutant  abatement  policy  in  the  static  case  where 
environmental damage is caused by a combination of flow pollutants and there are no delayed 
effects over time. This case has been examined previously by Endres (1985) and von Ungern-
Sternberg (1987). Here the purpose is to (1) rediscuss the problem in a way that is analogous to a 
firm’s  profit  maximization  problem,  and    (2)  to  generalize  the  previous  models  so  that  the 
optimal  level  of  environmental  protection  and  the  amount  of  abatement  expenditures  are 
determined  endogenously.  Endres  (1985)  assumed the  environmental target  and  von  Ungern-
Sternberg (1987) the budget for covering abatement costs to be given exogenously.  
For the sake of clarity, we restrict the analysis to the case of two pollutants (extending the 
analysis to the general setting with n pollutants is straightforward). Let x
0, y
0 denote the business-
as-usual (BAU) emissions that would occur without abatement, and 
0 [0, ] r x x ∈  and 
0 [0, ] r y y ∈  
the emission reductions achieved through abatement measures; the domain of ( , ) r r x y  is denoted 
by  { }
0 0 [0, ],[0, ] x y   = .  Pollution  abatement  is  viewed  in  a  broad  sense  as  including  both 
technical abatement options and changes in the scale and scope of economic activity. Actual 
emissions  x  and  y  equal  the  difference  between  the  BAU  emission  levels  and  abatement: 
0
r x x x = −  and 
0
r y y y = − . Emissions are inputs in the production of a physical damage agent z 
according to the relation 
0 0 ( , ) r r z f x x y y = − − . Of particular interest here are the properties of 
the function f , which will be discussed in more detail below. The damage function D(z) measures 
the damage cost caused by z units of the physical damage agent. D is assumed to be strictly   7 
increasing and convex (
2 2 / 0, / 0  dD dz d D dz z > ≥ ∀ ) as usual. The minimum cost of achieving 
the emission reductions xr and yr is given by the abatement cost function C(xr, yr). The abatement 
cost  function  is  assumed  to  be  increasing  in  both  arguments.  The  environmental  planner’s 
objective is to allocate resources to abatement activities producing emission reductions xr and yr 
so as to minimize the total cost (TC), which is the sum of the environmental damage costs and the 
abatement costs:  
( ) ( )
0 0
( , ) ( , ) min , min ( ( , )) ( , )
r r r r
r r r r r r x y x y TC x y D f x x y y C x y
∈  ∈  = − − + .                       (1) 
This planning problem has a compelling interpretation if we view it in terms of profit 
maximization:  the  emissions  that  remain  after  abatement  has  taken  place  (i.e., 
0
r x x −   and 
0
r y y − ) are inputs of production; function f is the firm’s production function; and z is the output 
of production. Suppose we posit a revenue function that equals the value of the damage avoided: 
0 0 0 0 ( , ) ( ( , )) ( ( , )) r r r r R x y D f x y D f x x y y = − − − .          (2)  
The firm’s profit maximization problem can then be stated as 
( , ) max ( , ) ( , )
r r
r r r r x y R x y C x y
∈  − .                                  (3) 
0 0 0 0
( , ) max ( ( , )) ( ( , )) ( , )
r r
r r r r x y D f x y D f x x y y C x y
∈  = − − − −         (4) 
0 0
( , ) max ( ( , )) ( , )
r r
r r x y D f x y TC x y
∈  = − .              (5) 
Observe that 
0 0 ( ( , )) D f x y  is a constant. Therefore, solving the environmental planner’s problem 
(1) is equivalent to solving the profit maximization problem (3): the optimal  , r r x y
∗ ∗ from (1) is 
also the optimal solution to (3). However, the environmental planner’s problem differs from the 
conventional firm’s problem in one important respect: as is evident from (4), the environmental   8 
planner  should  minimize  production  function  f  by  allocating  inputs 
0
r x x −   and 
0
r y y −   as 
inefficiently as possible. This proves to be a very useful insight for understanding problem (1).   
  The first-order conditions of the environmental planner’s problem (1) are 
0
r r
TC dD f C
x dz x x
∂ ∂ ∂
= − ⋅ + =
∂ ∂ ∂
                                                                            (6) 
  0
r r
TC dD f C
y dz y y
∂ ∂ ∂
= − ⋅ + =
∂ ∂ ∂
.                                                                       (7) 
It is easy to verify that the first-order conditions of problem (3) are equivalent to (6) and (7). A 
point  ( , ) r r x y , which satisfies conditions (6) and (7) simultaneously, is referred to as a critical 
point. It is a point at which the marginal reduction of damage is equal to the marginal abatement 
cost.  In  terms  of  production  theory,  a  critical  point  satisfies  the  standard  marginal-revenue-
equals-marginal-cost rule. The problem of the firm is usually well behaved in the sense that the 
production function is increasing and concave, and hence the optimal solution is achieved at the 
critical  point.  However,  the  problem  of  the  environmental  planner  is  not  necessary  so  well 
behaved: recall from (4) that we are trying to minimize function f rather than to maximize it. 
Even if conditions (6) and (7) characterize a unique critical point, it could be a local maximum of 
(1)  rather  than  a  minimum.  In  such  cases,  the  optimum  will  be  a  corner  solution,  where 
{ }
0 0, r x x ∈  or  { }
0 0, r y y ∈ , or both. There may also be cases where no critical point exists. The 
possibility that the optimum may be a corner solution even where problem (1) is well behaved 
has  also  been  acknowledged  by  Endres  (1985),  who  characterized  the  relationship  of  the 
derivatives of f and C at a corner..  
The type of optimum (i.e., a critical-point solution vs. a corner solution) has important 
implications  for  the optimal  abatement  strategy  and  the  environmental  policy  as  a whole.  A   9 
critical-point solution typically involves simultaneous abatement of all pollutants following the 
standard  marginal-benefit-equals-marginal-cost  efficiency  rule.  By  contrast,  a  corner  solution 
implies that all abatement efforts are focused on a single damage-producing input. Intuitively, a 
corner solution makes use of decreasing marginal products in that it creates scarcity in one of the 
input factors needed in damage production.  
Whether the critical point is a local minimum or maximum depends on the second-order 
optimality conditions, which can be presented by means of the Hessian matrix  
2 2 2
11 12
2 2 2
21 22
/ /
/ /
r r r
r r r
H H TC x TC x y
H
H H TC y x TC y
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
= =     ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
               (8) 
The Hessian of problem (1) and its determinant  H  are expressed in closed form in Appendix 1. 
A necessary condition for the objective function to attain its minimum at the critical point is that 
the Hessian is positive semi-definite at this point. Positive semi-definiteness requires that  
(A)  11 0 H ≥ , 
(B)  22 0 H ≥ , 
 (C)  11 22 12 21 0 H H H H H = ⋅ − ⋅ ≥ . 
If these conditions hold, the critical point is a local minimum, but not necessarily the global 
minimum. If any one of these three conditions fails, the optimal abatement policy will be a corner 
solution. In contrast to the analysis presented here, Endres (1985) proceeded from the assumption 
that the functions f  and TC are such that conditions (A) to (C) are satisfied; corner solutions 
arising from one of conditions (A) to (C) failing were not addressed in his analysis.   
As it is difficult to determine from the outset whether a critical-point or corner solution is 
optimal, it is again illustrative to interpret conditions (A)-(C) from the perspective of the theory 
of the firm. Condition (A) can be expressed in the form   10 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 0
r
d D f dD f C
dz x dz x x
∂ ∂ ∂   ⋅ + ⋅ + ≥   ∂ ∂ ∂  
.               (9) 
The first term in (A) is the product of the scale effect in the damage function and the squared 
marginal product of input x. The second term consists of the returns to scale in the production of 
the  damage  agent  multiplied  by  the  marginal  monetary  damage.  The  third  term  represents 
economies of scale in the abatement activities. Summing up the effects, condition (A) will always 
hold when both f and C exhibit increasing returns to scale (
2
2 0
f
x
∂
>
∂
 and 
2
2 0
r
C
x
∂
>
∂
). Condition 
(A) may be violated if f exhibits (strongly) decreasing returns to scale (
2
2 0
f
x
∂
<
∂
) or there are 
economies of scale in abatement (
2
2 0
r
C
x
∂
<
∂
). A similar conclusion holds for condition (B). 
  Condition (C) is most likely to hold when the production function exhibits increasing 
returns to scale (
2 2
2 2 0, 0
f f
x y
∂ ∂
> >
∂ ∂
) and negative synergies (
2
0
f
x y
∂
<
∂ ∂
), and when the abatement 
activity exhibits diseconomies of scale (
2 2
2 2 0, 0
r r
C C
x y
∂ ∂
> >
∂ ∂
) and economies of scope (
2
0
r r
C
x y
∂
<
∂ ∂
) 
(see Appendix 1 for further details). The optimum is most likely to be a corner solution when the 
production  function  exhibits  decreasing  returns  to  scale  (
2 2
2 2 0, 0
f f
x y
∂ ∂
< <
∂ ∂
)  and  positive 
synergies (
2
0
f
x y
∂
>
∂ ∂
), and when the cost function exhibits economies of scale (
2 2
2 2 0, 0
r r
C C
x y
∂ ∂
< <
∂ ∂
) 
and diseconomies of scope (
2
0
r r
C
x y
∂
>
∂ ∂
). In sum, whether the optimum is a critical-point or a   11 
corner  solution  depends  essentially  on  the  shape  of  functions  f  and  C,  although  the  damage 
function D may also play a role. 
 
3. Efficient multipollutant abatement policy: stock pollutants  
We next extend the analysis in section 2 to the case of stock pollutants, and then illustrate the 
types of solutions arising in some instructive examples. The inputs to damage production now 
consist of accumulated stocks of pollutants, denoted by 
t X  and 
t Y , with t indicating the period. 
These accumulated inputs are analogous to the capital stocks in a firm’s production process. The 
physical  damage  agent  is  produced  according  to  the  function  ( , )
t t t z f X Y = .  The  damage 
function  ( )
t D z   again  measures  the  monetary  damage.  The  business-as-usual  flow  emissions 
which would occur in period t without an abatement policy  are denoted by 
0 x  and 
0 y . For 
simplicity, we assume that 
0 x  and 
0 y  are given and constant over time. The emission reductions 
produced by abatement activities in period t are denoted by 
t
r x  and 
t
r y . As before, actual flow 
emissions  in  period  t  equal  the  difference  between  the  BAU  emissions  and  abatement.  The 
change in the pollutant stocks from one period to the next is then governed by 
1 0 (1 )
t t t
x r X d X x x
+ = − + −                  (10) 
1 0 (1 )
t t t
y r Y d Y y y
+ = − + − .                          (11) 
The environmental planner’s problem now is to minimize the total cost (i.e., the sum of 
damage and abatement costs) over time through his or her choice of investment levels. The total 
cost in period t can be expressed as 
( , , , ) ( ( , )) ( , )
t t t t t t t t
r r r r TC X Y x y D f X Y C x y = + .              (12)   12 
To  analyze  the  problem  within  a  dynamic  programming  framework,  we  formulate  it  as  a 
maximization  problem by  positing  a reward  function that equals the  negative  of the  sum  of 
damage and abatement costs in each period: 
( , , , ) ( , , , )
t t t t t t t t
r r r r R X Y x y TC X Y x y = − .                                                (13)                    
Let 
1 (1 ) δ β
− = +  denote the discount factor associated with discount rate β. The environmental 
planner’s intertemporal optimization problem is then 
{ }
( , ) 0
max ( , , , )
t t
r r
t t t t t
r r
x y t
TC X Y x y δ
∞
∈  =
− ∑ ,              (14) 
subject to the stock equations (10) and (11).  
We  assume  that  the  abatement  costs  occur  in  the  same  period  as  the  corresponding 
emission reductions and that no costs carry over to future periods. In reality, abatement measures 
may require investments in abatement technology that reduces emissions over several subsequent 
periods  without  additional  costs.  In  this  regard,  we  simply  assume  that  the  investment 
expenditure is allocated proportionally over the time periods in which the emission reductions 
occur. 
  The sum of current and future rewards satisfies the Bellman equation  
( ) ( ) { }
1 1
( , )
, max ( , , , ) ,
t t
r r
t t t t t t t t
r r
x y
V X Y TC X Y x y V X Y δ
+ +
∈ 
= − + .        (15) 
Consider now the optimal abatement levels. The first-order conditions for the problem in (15) 
imply that the optimal abatement levels must satisfy  
1 1
0
t t
X Y t t t
r r r
TC X Y
x x x
δ λ λ
+ +   ∂ ∂ ∂   − + + =   ∂ ∂ ∂  
,              (16) 
1 1
0
t t
X Y t t t
r r r
TC X Y
y y y
δ λ λ
+ +   ∂ ∂ ∂   − + + =   ∂ ∂ ∂  
,             (17)   13 
where  X
V
X
λ
∂
=
∂
 and  Y
V
Y
λ
∂
=
∂
. Application of the Envelope Theorem to the same problem 
implies that along the optimal path the states must satisfy 
1 1 t t
X Y X t t t
TC X Y
X X X
δ λ λ λ
+ +   ∂ ∂ ∂   − + + =
  ∂ ∂ ∂  
,            (18) 
1 1 t t
X Y Y t t t
TC X Y
Y Y Y
δ λ λ λ
+ +   ∂ ∂ ∂   − + + =
  ∂ ∂ ∂  
,            (19) 
A pair of period t emission reductions ( , )
t t
r r x y ∈  that satisfies both (16) and (17), given 
( , )
t t X Y , is again referred to as a critical point. The optimality conditions set the marginal reward 
of additional abatement investment in the current period equal to the discounted marginal value 
of  reduced  damage  in  the  following  period;  this  is  measured  by  the  sum  of  the  marginal 
reductions in the two pollution stocks, which are valued at the shadow costs of the pollutants,  X λ  
and  Y λ . However, as in the static case, there may not exist abatement levels that satisfy both 
conditions (16) and (17), or the optimal policy may be a corner solution where  { }
0 0,
t
r x x ∈  or 
{ }
0 0,
t
r y y ∈ .  
A sufficient condition for a sequence of abatements satisfying the first-order conditions 
above  to  be  optimal  for  maximizing  the  sum  of  abatement  profits  over  time  is  that 
( , , , )
t t t t
r r TC X Y x y  be convex in its arguments. The conditions for convexity of TC are discussed 
in Appendix 2. As in the static case, it is difficult to determine from the outset whether the 
sufficient conditions are satisfied or whether corner solutions arise. To illustrate the two types of 
solutions, we next turn to some interesting examples. The proofs of the propositions discussed 
below are presented in Appendix 3. 
   14 
3.1 Linear production function 
We start out with the simple but widely used model where pollutants are perfect substitutes in 
damage  production.  For  example,  measuring  the  relative  contribution  of  different  GHGs  to 
climate damage by some fixed coefficients (e.g., the often used global warming potential indices) 
implies perfect input substitution. Perfect input substitution in turn implies that the production 
function takes the linear form 
( , )
t t t t f X Y X Y α β = + .                                                     (20) 
In the case of a linear production function, the optimality conditions imply that 
                               X Y t t
r r
C C
x y
λ λ
∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
.                                                                                      (21)                                                    
At a critical point, the ratio of marginal abatement costs should equal the ratio of shadow costs of 
the two pollutants. The shadow costs are given by 
( ) 1 1
z
X
X
D
d
α
λ
δ
=
  − −  
 and 
( ) 1 1
z
Y
Y
D
d
β
λ
δ
=
  − −  
, 
where  z D  is the derivative of the damage function with respect to the damage agent. The shadow 
cost  of  each  pollutant  equals  the  marginal  damage  caused  by  the  pollutant,  adjusted  by  a 
discounted effect based on an economic discount factor and the decay rate of the pollutant. We 
restate the following known result: 
 
Proposition 1: Given a linear production function f, if the abatement cost function C is convex 
and there exists a sequence  { }
, , 1 1
0 , , ,
t t t t
r r t x y X Y
∞ ∗ ∗ + +
=  satisfying the first-order conditions (16) to 
(19), with ( , ) (0,0) r r x y
∗ ∗ > , then this sequence is the optimal solution to problem (14).  
   15 
However, the fact that such a critical point does not always exist has received little attention since 
the static treatment by Endres (1985). It is possible that   
( )
( )
1 1
   ( , )
1 1
Y t t
r r t t
r r X
d C C
x y
x y d
α δ
β δ
  − − ∂ ∂   > ∀ ∈ 
  ∂ ∂ − −  
.            (22) 
 
Equation (22) states the following: if the marginal cost of abating x emissions relative to that of 
abating y emissions is greater than the shadow cost of pollutant X relative to that of pollutant Y, 
for all   ( , )
t t
r r x y ∈ , the optimal abatement strategy is a corner solution, where all abatement 
efforts are focused on pollutant y, one which is relatively less expensive to abate. If the sign of 
the inequality is reversed (<), then all abatement should be focused on pollutant x. If a critical 
point does exist, then the optimal abatement strategy depends on the shape of the abatement cost 
function. 
This  result  shows  that  simultaneous  abatement  of  all  pollutants  is  likely  to  prove 
beneficial when the inputs to damage production are perfectly substitutable and the abatement 
cost  function  is  convex. Convexity  of  the  abatement  cost  function  means  that the  abatement 
activities exhibit diseconomies of scale and economies of scope. Both are reasonable assumptions 
in  the  context  of  abatement  measures.  We    emphasize  again  that  Proposition  1  assumes  the 
existence  of  a  critical  point  in  all  periods  t  that  satisfies  the  first-order  conditions.  Even  if 
production function f is linear and the abatement cost function is convex, the optimal abatement 
strategy in period t may be a corner solution if no critical point exists.  
   16 
3.2 Leontief production function 
We  next  consider  the  case  where  damage  production  is  represented  by  a  Leontief  function. 
Among the canonical production functions in economics, the Leontief function is an extreme 
special case in that it allows no input substitution. In ecology, however, it is considered to most 
accurately describe the production of algae from nitrogen and phosphorus (e.g., Redfield et al. 
1963; Tyrrell 1999). The Leontief production function takes the form 
{ } ( , ) min ,
t t t t f X Y X Y α β = .                (23) 
The function is not differentiable. In production theory, the standard cost-minimizing solution to 
producing a given output level in this case implies that the inputs are used in fixed proportions, 
with 
X
Y
β
α
= .  Finding  the  optimal  solution  to  a  dynamic  pollution  control  problem  is  more 
complicated in that the inputs to the damage function are stocks and thus change only slowly over 
time in response to changes in the abatement levels. When the production process and investment 
decisions concern a “bad”, should the emissions of all pollutants be abated in fixed proportions, 
or should one focus abatement efforts on a single pollutant?  
In case of the Leontief function, we obtain a rather strong result:  
 
Proposition 2: If the production function is of the Leontief form and the marginal abatement 
costs  are  positive,  then  the  optimal  cost-minimizing  abatement  path  consists  of  the  corner 
solutions 
, ( ,0)
t
r x
∗  or 
, (0, )
t
r y
∗ , where all abatement efforts focus on a single pollutant in each 
period t. 
   17 
  This result is remarkably general in its scope, because it does not depend on the shape of 
the damage function D or the synergies (convexity, concavity) of the abatement cost function. 
Indeed,  the  strategy  of  a  creating  shortage  in  the  input  supply  for  f  works  best  when  the 
production activity consumes inputs in fixed proportions. Interestingly, marine ecologists have 
already applied this strategy for a long time in analyzing which nutrient limits algae production in 
coastal areas (see, e.g., Elofsson 2006 and references therein).  
   
3.3 Cobb-Douglas production function and linear abatement costs   
Finally, consider the canonical textbook case of the Cobb-Douglas production function together 
with a linear abatement cost function and exponential damage:  ( , ) ,  , 0 z f X Y X Y
α β α β = = > , 
( , ) r r r r C x y Ax By = + , and  ( ) exp( ) D z z = . In this setting, the optimal solution will always be a 
corner solution. 
 
Proposition 3: If the production function is of Cobb-Douglas form, the abatement cost function 
is linear, and the damage function is exponential, then the optimal cost-minimizing abatement 
path consists of corner solutions 
, ( ,0)
t
r x
∗  or 
, (0, )
t
r y
∗ , where all abatement efforts are focused on a 
single pollutant in each period t.     
 
  This result depends on specific assumptions about the functional forms, and as such it is 
not as general in scope as Proposition 1. Still, taken together these special cases show that the 
optimal solution in a wide variety of environmental problems is likely to be a corner solution. 
The  conclusion  that  can  be  drawn  here  is  that  the  optimal  solution  to  the  dynamic 
pollution  abatement problem may  well  involve corner  solutions,  where  abatement efforts  are   18 
focused on a single damage-causing factor that limits pollution. Similar results hold for the static 
setting. Technically, the corner solutions can arise because either the first-order conditions or the 
second-order  conditions  cannot  be  satisfied.  Since  the  problem  cannot  be  assumed  from  the 
outset  to  be  well  behaved,  it  is  important  to  verify  that  the  second-order  conditions  of  an 
optimization problem also hold.  We will proceed to illustrate the above findings in the context of 
some illustrative empirical examples.  
 
4. Empirical examples: eutrophication and climate change 
4.1 Eutrophication 
Eutrophication occurs when high concentrations of nitrogen and phosphorus stimulate excessive 
growth  of  aquatic  plants,  primarily  algae.  Excessive  production  of  algae  can  affect  people’s 
health directly, as in the case of toxic blue-green algae, and detract from the value of recreational 
activities in the form of decreased water transparency and filamentous algae covering the seabed. 
Algae contain nitrogen and phosphorus in fixed proportions (Redfield et al. 1963, Tyrrell 1999), 
and thus algae production can be described by a Leontief production function:  
  { } ( , ) min ,
t t t t t z f X Y aX bY = = ,                (24) 
where 
t X  is the stock of accumulated nitrogen, 
t Y  the stock of accumulated phosphorus, and a 
and b parameters of the production function (see Table 1). The essential dynamics of the stocks 
of nitrogen and phosphorus can in many cases be represented by the simple nutrient carry-over 
equations 
1
0 (1 )
t t t
x r X d X x x
+ = − + −                     (25) 
1
0 (1 )
t t t
y r Y d Y y y
+ = − + − ,                    (26)   19 
where  x d  is annual denitrification,  y d  net sedimentation of phosphorus,  0 x  and  0 y  the nitrogen 
and phosphorus loads corresponding to no abatement,  and 
t
r x  and 
t
r y  the abatement levels for 
nitrogen and phosphorus.  
  We consider an ecosystem receiving external nutrient loading from agricultural sources 
and municipal wastewater discharges. We assume that in agriculture only nitrogen abatement is 
possible in the short run. The abatement cost is of quadratic form  
 
2 ( ,0) ( )
t t
r r C x A x = .                   (27) 
Abatement  measures  include  reducing  fertilization  rates  and  establishing  buffer  zones  and 
wetlands.  Both  reduced  fertilization  and  agricultural  abatement  practices  generally  incur 
increasing marginal costs. 
In the case of wastewater, both nitrogen and phosphorus can be removed at wastewater 
treatment plants. The cost of biological nitrogen removal is 
t
r Bx , and the same process removes 
t
r y
t
r qx =   units  of  phosphorus.  Nutrient  abatement  through  wastewater  treatment  primarily 
involves applying chemicals to pools of collected wastewater; constant marginal cost is hence a 
reasonable approximation (assuming that treatment facilities are already in place). The capacity 
of the wastewater treatment facilities sets an upper bound on this abatement measure.  
Combining  the  different  abatement  measures,  the  cost  function  becomes  a  piecewise 
quadratic function:   20 
( )
2
2
2
if 
+ ( ) if  +  and 
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                             >  
 (28) 
This function is derived by applying the abatement measures that achieve the given abatement 
target (or better) at the minimum cost; note that wastewater treatment is typically less expensive 
than agricultural nitrogen abatement. The first line describes a situation where more phosphorus 
than nitrogen is removed (in relative terms), and thus abatement costs depend on the amount of 
phosphorus abatement; removal of nitrogen is a side benefit. The second line relates to a situation 
where phosphorus is reduced through wastewater treatment, and a small additional amount of 
nitrogen  is  reduced  in  agriculture.  The  third  line  differs  from  the  second  in  that  nitrogen 
abatement is relatively more extensive, and phosphorus abatement is achieved as a side benefit of 
wastewater treatment. The fourth line refers to a situation where nitrogen is reduced in both 
wastewater treatment facilities and agriculture, while phosphorus abatement remains within the 
capacity of the wastewater treatment facility. Finally, the fifth line describes a case where the 
abatement target for phosphorus exceeds the capacity of the wastewater treatment facility.   
An exponential damage function is assumed that is similar to the one in Laukkanen and 
Huhtala (2008):  
( ) exp /( )
t t D z E F z G   = + −   .              (29) 
Table 1 reports the values of the parameters in functions (24) to (29) and the sources of 
the values. The parameterization is based on the situation in the Finnish coastal waters of the Gulf   21 
of Finland. However, since we consider a stylized model of the ecosystem, the application is 
intended to provide an illustration of the model presented in the preceding sections rather than 
policy prescriptions for a specific coastal zone. 
Consider first the case of no abatement. In the absence of any abatement measures, the 
nitrogen stock is projected to increase from 40 to nearly 70 thousand tons in the next ten years. 
An increase in the phosphorus stock is also anticipated, albeit a more moderate one, from 6 to 7.5 
thousand tons. The damage costs are projected to increase from 8.8 million euro to nearly 8 
billion euro in the next 40 years. Clearly, abatement measures can yield great savings in damage 
costs. It is noteworthy that phosphorus would replace nitrogen as the limiting factor of algae 
growth  from  the  first  year  onwards.  Many  economic  and  ecological  models  of  combating 
eutrophication have been constructed to account only for the nutrient that is the limiting factor at 
the initial state. Given that both nitrogen and phosphorus accumulate over time, according to 
different dynamic processes, the factor limiting algae growth may well change as the relative 
concentrations of the two nutrients change. Focusing on one nutrient only may yield results that 
should be interpreted with considerable caution. 
[Table 1 around here] 
The optimal abatement strategy was found by means of a numerical search. Focusing 
abatement  efforts  on  phosphorus  removal  in  wastewater  treatment  facilities  was  the  profit-
maximizing  solution.  The  optimal  abatement  strategy  involves  maximum  reduction  of 
phosphorus in the wastewater treatment facilities in the first two years to achieve the steady state, 
and a subsequent reduction of 584 tons of phosphorus yearly from the third year onwards. As a 
side benefit, nitrogen loads are also reduced. The damage and abatement costs of the optimal 
phosphorus abatement strategy and the total cost saving are summarized in Table 2.   22 
For comparison, we also computed the corresponding figures for the optimal nitrogen 
abatement strategy, as well as for a policy that would reduce the emissions of both nutrients to 
fifty percent of their current levels, as the strategy of the Helsinki Commission recommends. The 
results clearly  illustrate  the  economies of  specialization. The  optimal  abatement  strategy  that 
focuses resources on phosphorus abatement reduces total cost by over 6 billion euro compared to 
the optimal nitrogen abatement strategy, and almost 10 billion euro compared to a fifty-percent 
reduction of each nutrient. The main advantage of the phosphorus abatement strategy is its low 
abatement cost compared to the other options.  
[Table 2 around here] 
Figure 1 illustrates the development of the total cost savings of the different abatement 
strategies (in net present value terms) during the first 40 years. In all strategies, the highest cost 
savings materialize about 15 years after the initial abatement measures are implemented. Note 
that  the  optimal  phosphorus  abatement  strategy  saves  costs  immediately,  from  the  first  year 
onwards, whereas the nitrogen abatement and the fifty-percent uniform reduction strategies incur 
higher costs than the strategy of no abatement during the first five or six years.  
[Figure 1 around here] 
These findings indicate that focusing resources on phosphorus abatement is the optimal 
strategy for reducing damage caused by the excessive growth of algae. Additional support for 
adopting  the  phosphorus  limitation  strategy  is  the  fact  that  blooms  of  nitrogen-fixing 
cyanobacteria, some of which are toxic, are governed solely by phosphorus concentrations;  this 
has not been taken into account in the  above  analysis. That nitrogen abatement alone  yields 
higher savings  than the  fifty-percent joint reduction  strategy suggests  that  specialization  is  a 
relatively robust choice under uncertainty about the parameter values: even a focus on the wrong   23 
nutrient  yields  higher  benefits  than  a  strategy  that  applies  equal  abatement  rates  for  both 
substances.  
 
4.2 Climate change 
The greenhouse effect is enhanced by many different gases that influence the climate in various 
ways.  Today  there  are  still  many  uncertainties  in  the  causal chain  connecting  emissions  and 
abatement measures to impacts. As new information has been obtained, the focus of the efforts to 
reduce  the  threat of  climate  change  has  shifted  from  stabilizing carbon  dioxide  emissions to 
stabilizing  atmospheric  greenhouse  gas  (GHG)  concentrations.  Moreover,  scientists  are 
increasingly  looking  beyond  GHG  concentrations  to  radiative  forcing.  The  need  to  consider 
multigas  abatement  polices  is  widely  recognized  today.  Different  GHGs  contribute  to  total 
radiative forcing and hence to temperature in different ways. The dynamics of the different GHGs 
also differ. For example, nitrous oxide (N2O) has a lifetime of 120 years, whereas methane (CH4) 
degrades  in  just  12  years.  The  following  example  examines  how  the  tradeoffs  between  the 
different GHGs should be balanced given the gases’ different impacts and stock dynamics. The 
optimal abatement strategy in the presence of multiple GHGs is analyzed within a dynamic cost-
benefit framework. Again, the empirical model serves to illustrate the different types of solutions 
and the importance of accounting for the possibility of corner solutions. The underlying climate 
model  is  a  simplified  one,  and  the  results  should  be  used  as  modeling  rather  than  policy 
guidelines. The functional forms and the parameter values of the example have been adapted 
from Aaheim et al. (2006), Tol (2006), and Fisher and Narain (2003).  
The process that causes the greenhouse effect has the following nested structure. Firstly, the 
concentrations of GHGs contribute to total radiative forcing according to equation (IPCC 2001; 
Aaheim et al. 2006)   24 
    
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 ln( / ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t t t t X X X X X X X X φ α α α α = + − + − + − ,     (30) 
where  1
t X  is the concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2),  2
t X  the concentration of CH4,  3
t X  the 
concentration of N2O, and  4
t X  the concentration of sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) in period t; values of 
X with superscript 0 refer to the initial concentrations in the year 2000, and parameters  α are 
scaling factors that transform the concentration into radiative forcing (indirect effects of methane 
have been taken into account in the calibration of parameter  2 α ). The increase in the global mean 
temperature is governed by radiative forcing according to (Tol 2006) 
1 t t t T T ϕ γφ
− = + .                  (31) 
Finally,  the  damage  from  increased  temperature  is  given  by  the  quadratic  damage  function 
(Fisher and Narain 2003) 
 
2
1 2 ( ) ( )
t t t D T T T θ θ = + .                 (32) 
For CH4, N2O and SF6, the dynamics of the GHG concentrations are represented by the 
difference equation 
1 (1 1/ )
t t t t
j j j j j X X x a τ
+ = − + − ,                (33) 
where the subscript j =2,3,4 refers to the GHG,  j τ  is the lifetime of gas j, 
t
j x  is the emission of 
gas j in period t, and 
t
j a  is the reduction of gas j in period t. The baseline emissions 
t
j x  are 
exogenously given; in the baseline scenario, the emissions are assumed to remain constant at their 
year 2000 levels. For CO2, the dynamics are somewhat more complicated. Following Aaheim et 
al. (2006), only a fraction  (0,1) ψ ∈  of the CO2 stock degrades naturally, the remaining part, 
(1 ) ψ − , accumulating in the atmosphere. Thus, the dynamics of the CO2 stock can be represented 
by 
1
1 1 1 1 (1 / )
t t t t
j X X x a ψ τ
+ = − + − .               (34)   25 
The abatement cost functions have been estimated by Aaheim et al. (2006) based on data 
of the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The 
abatement cost functions take the log-linear form  
4
1
( ) ( )
j t
j j
j
C t A a
β
=
=∑ ,                   (35) 
where the parameters  , j j A β  are gas-specific constants. Note that the marginal abatement costs 
are given by  
1 ( )
( ) ( )
j t t
j j j j j t
j
C t
MC a A a
a
β β
− ∂
= =
∂
.               (36) 
According to the parameter values estimated by Aaheim et al. (2006), the marginal costs are 
positive for all gases, as expected. The abatement activities are said to exhibit economies of scale 
if  
2 2 ( )
( ) ( ) 0
j
t
j t
j j j j t
j
dMC a
A a
da
β β β
− = − < .             (37) 
Parameter estimates of  j β  by Aaheim et al. range between 0.12 and 0.35, which implies that the 
abatement cost function exhibits strong economies of scale. Finally, to guarantee that the model 
achieves  meaningful  abatement  levels,  we  impose  the  following  inequality  constraints: 
0    1,2,3,4;  1,...,
t t
i i a x i t ≤ ≤ ∀ = = ∞ . The parameter values are calibrated for the global region. 
Table 3 reports the parameter values of the functions together with their sources.  
[Table 3 around here] 
As solving the optimal abatement paths by analytical methods proved too complex, we 
resorted  to the  “brute  force” strategy  of  numerical optimization. We  first  solved  the  optimal 
abatement  levels  under  the  simplifying  assumption     , 1,..., ;   1,2,3,4
t s
i i a a s t i = ∀ = ∞ = .  These   26 
levels were then used as an initial guess for subsequent iterations. Given the initial guess, we 
optimized the abatement levels of period t using the Newton’s algorithm. We then updated our 
guess for the remaining periods and moved on to the next period. We enumerated the first 500 
periods  and  then  returned  to  period  1.  The  algorithm  was  run  several  times  to  achieve  full 
convergence. 
This  iterative  procedure  converged  to  a  corner  solution  where  CH4  and  NO2  were  not 
reduced at all, whereas all emissions of SF6 were. Interestingly, the abatement of CO2 exhibited a 
periodic  pattern  in  which  periods  of  one-hundred-percent  and  zero  abatement  alternate.  The 
development of the GHG stocks is illustrated in Figure 2, and the increase in global temperature 
(in degrees Celsius) in Figure 3. The CH4 and NO2 stocks remain at a constant level without 
abatement.  The  CO2  stock  more  than  doubles  in  size  in  the  first  eight  years,  as  there  is  no 
abatement during that period. From the year 2009 onwards, all CO2 emissions are reduced for a 
period  of  40  years,  which  decreases  the  CO2 stock  back  towards  its  starting  level.  This  is 
followed by a one-period break in abatement activities. Subsequently, the periods of eight  to nine 
years  of  intensive  abatement  are  followed  by  a  one-year  break.  As  a  result,  the  CO2  stock 
fluctuates heavily, which also shows up as some variation in the temperature path over time. 
Despite  the  fluctuations,  according  to  this  model  the  periodic  abatement  of  CO2  and  total 
abatement of SF6 suffice to halt the rise of the global temperature. Such an abatement strategy 
yields $446.2 billion in cost savings in net present value terms (with a five-percent discount rate). 
Compared to the BAU scenario, the reduction of damage costs amounts to $480 billion; the 
abatement costs amount to only $34 billion. 
[Figures 2 and 3 around here] 
In this example, the corner solution is driven by the economies of scale in abatement, which 
makes the cost function non-convex. A well-behaved abatement problem would require a convex   27 
cost function. A concave cost function makes it advantageous to alternate periodically between 
zero and one-hundred-percent abatement levels. Although there is a great deal of uncertainty 
about the parameters of the abatement cost function, the corner solution outcome is robust to 
changes in the parameter values: the estimates of  j β  by Aaheim et al. range between 0.12 and 
0.35. Convexity of the cost function would require parameter values greater than one.  
To conclude, it must be emphasized that this stylized example is strictly for illustrative 
purposes. The model presents a drastic simplification of reality. Besides uncertainty about the 
model  parameters,  there  is  considerable  uncertainty  about  the  model  structure,  appropriate 
functional forms, and the future flows of greenhouse gases. Thus, the analysis presented in this 
example  should  not  be  used  for  drawing  conclusions  regarding  environmental  policy. 
Nevertheless, we believe that this example convincingly demonstrates the potential importance of 
corner solutions in the context of climate policy. 
 
5. Conclusions and discussion  
We have examined the problem of environmental management in the case of multiple pollutants 
using  the  perspective  of  production theory.  Production  theory  is  accustomed  to  dealing  with 
multiple inputs and provides powerful insights for the analysis of environmental policy where  
multiple pollutants are involved. The objective of environmental management of course differs 
from that of a firm in that an environmental planner seeks to minimize the output of a damage 
agent, subject to limited abatement resources, whereas a firm seeks to maximize output. Standard 
regularity conditions lead to an interior solution in the case of a firm’s maximization problem; the 
same conditions result in a corner solution when it comes to minimization. Indeed, our results 
indicate that many common environmental problems give rise to corner solutions, where the   28 
optimal policy consists of focusing all abatement effort on one pollutant. While corner solutions 
are analytically inconvenient, in light of the results it is important to build models and analyses in 
such a way that such solutions are appropriately accommodated.  
Two key environmental problems of today - eutrophication and climate change - were 
analyzed as empirical examples. In the case of eutrophication, the optimal policy consisted of 
phosphorus abatement. Significant cost savings were obtained relative to the uniform reduction 
target suggested, for example, by the Helsinki Commission’s guidelines for water protection. 
Even  focusing  on  the  wrong  pollutant  resulted  in  cost  savings  when  compared  to  following 
uniform abatement targets. The case of eutrophication is special in that the production of algae is 
characterized by a Leontief production function. In the case of climate change, the functional 
forms pertaining to damage production and costs are smooth. Nevertheless, the optimal policy 
was again a corner solution, where only the emissions of SF6 and CO2 were reduced, with CO2 
abatement alternating between periods of 0% and 100% reductions.     29 
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Appendix 1: The determinant of the Hessian matrix 
The Hessian matrix of problem (1) can be stated as  
2 2 2
11 12
2 2 2
21 22
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
/ /
/ /
r r r
r r r
r r r
r r
H H TC x TC x y
H
H H TC y x TC y
d D f dD f C d D f dD f C
dz x dz x x dz y dz x y x y
d D f dD f C d D
dz x dz x y x y dz
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
= =     ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   − ⋅ − ⋅ − − ⋅ − ⋅ −     ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂     =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   − ⋅ − ⋅ − − ⋅   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
2 2 2
2 2
.
r
f dD f C
y dz y y
 
 
 
 
  ∂ ∂   − ⋅ −     ∂ ∂ ∂    
      (A1.1) 
Its determinant can be written as 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
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  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ −     ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 0.
r r
r r r r
r r r r
f f
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dD f C f C f C
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+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ≥   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
              (A1.2) 
The  terms  on  the  first  and  the  second  lines  of  the  determinant  can  be  positive  or  negative 
depending on the economies of scale and scope of the production function f. Similarly, the terms 
on the third and fourth lines can be positive or negative depending on the economies of scale and 
scope  of  the  abatement  cost  function  C.  Finally,  the  term  on  the  fifth  line  depends  on  the 
economies of scale and scope of both f and C. In general, condition (C) is most likely to hold 
when  the  production  function  exhibits  increasing  returns  to  scale 
2 2
2 2 0, 0
f f
x y
  ∂ ∂
> >   ∂ ∂  
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negative synergies 
2
0
f
x y
  ∂
<   ∂ ∂  
, and when the abatement activity exhibits diseconomies of scale 
2 2
2 2 0, 0
r r
C C
x y
  ∂ ∂
> >   ∂ ∂  
 and economies of scope 
2
0
r r
C
x y
  ∂
<   ∂ ∂  
. The optimum is most likely to be a 
corner  solution  when  the  production  function  exhibits  decreasing  returns  to  scale 
2 2
2 2 0, 0
f f
x y
  ∂ ∂
< <   ∂ ∂  
  and  positive  synergies 
2
0
f
x y
  ∂
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,  and  when  the  cost  function  exhibits 
economies of scale 
2 2
2 2 0, 0
r r
C C
x y
  ∂ ∂
< <   ∂ ∂  
 and diseconomies of scope 
2
0
r r
C
x y
  ∂
>   ∂ ∂  
.      
 
Appendix 2. Sufficient conditions for a maximum: dynamic case 
A sufficient condition for a sequence of abatements satisfying the first-order conditions (16) to 
(19)  to  be  optimal  for  maximizing  the  sum  of  abatement  profits  over  time  is  that 
( , , , )
t t t t
r r TC X Y x y  be convex in its arguments. Convexity holds if and only if the Hessian matrix  
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                      (A2.1) 
is positive semi-definite. Strict convexity would requires the Hessian to be positive definite. The 
Hessian can be written as    34 
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Positive semi-definitiveness requires that the principal minors of H are all positive. We have  
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 0      0
TC d D f dD f
X dz X dz X
    ∂ ∂ ∂     ≥ ⇔ + ≥         ∂ ∂ ∂    
.                           (A2.3)               
Condition (A2.3) is similar to condition (A) in the static case, with the exception that the second 
derivative of the cost function is absent. The production function now has pollutant stocks rather 
than flows as arguments, whereas the costs remain a function of the pollutant flows. Again, the 
first two components in (A2.3) can be interpreted as the product of the scale effect in the damage 
function and the squared marginal product of input X, both of which are generally positive. The 
second term depends on the returns to scale in damage production. As marginal damages are 
increasing  by  assumption,  condition  (A2.3)  will  always  hold  when  f  exhibits  increasing  or 
constant returns to scale 
2
2 0
f
X
  ∂   ≥     ∂  
. If f instead exhibits decreasing returns to scale, condition 
(A2.3) may be violated.   
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(A2.4) 
As with condition (C) in the static case, it is  difficult to determine  from the outset  whether 
condition (A2.4) holds. Here condition (A2.4) is most likely to hold when the production function   35 
f  exhibits  negative  synergies  (
2 f
X Y
∂
∂ ∂
<0)  or  the  synergies  are  small  relative  to  the  marginal 
product of each input.  
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Assuming that 
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>0, condition (A2.5) will hold if and only if condition (A2.4) is satisfied.  
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Assuming  that  condition  (A2.4)  is  satisfied,  condition  (A2.6)  will  hold  when 
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. The condition is likely to be satisfied when the abatement activity 
exhibits  diseconomies  of  scale 
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  that  are  large  relative  to  economies  or 
diseconomies of scope.    36 
Appendix 3. Proofs of propositions 
Proposition 1 
Suppose that the optimal abatement vector in period t is ( ) ( )
,* ,* , 0,0
t t
r r x y > ; i.e., both emissions are 
abated. We will show that this statement is a contradiction. 
Let us move along the isocost line  ( , ) r r C C x y
∗ ∗ = . Totally differentiating the expression 
gives   0 r r
r r
C C
dx dy
x y
∂ ∂
+ =
∂ ∂
, from which the slope of the isocost line is 
r
r r r
dx C C
y x dy
∂ ∂
= −
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. Since 
the marginal abatement costs are positive by assumption, the isocost line is downward sloping.  
Under the maintained assumptions about C, D, and f, the value  function V is strictly 
decreasing in z. Without loss of generality, we may assume that given ( )
,* ,* ,
t t
r r x y , input X is the 
limiting factor in period t+1 in the sense that  { }
1 1 1 1 min ,
t t t t z X Y X α β α
+ + + + = = . Now, since the 
isocost line is downward sloping, there exists another point 
, , ( , ): ,
t t t t t t
r r r r r r x y x x y y
∗ ∗ > < ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  such that 
, , ( , ) ( , )
t t t t
r r r r C x y C x y
∗ ∗ = ɶ ɶ . But clearly,  
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α β
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ɶ ɶ
        (A3.1) 
Since there exists another point that yields a lower value for the damage agent in the subsequent 
period, and thus a higher value for  ( )
1 t V z
+ , with the same abatement cost, the assumption that 
( ) ( )
,* ,* , 0,0
t t
r r x y >  is the optimal solution does not hold. Therefore, the optimal solution is always 
a  corner  solution  ( ,0) r x
∗   or  (0, ) r y
∗ ,  where  it  is  not  possible  to  move  along  the  isoquant  to 
preferable points. □ 
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Proposition 2 
Since f is linear and the damage function D is increasing and convex, conditions (A2.1) and 
(A2.2) (see Appendix 2) hold. Abatement cost function C is convex by assumption. Given that 
(A2.2) is satisfied, (A2.3) then also holds. Condition (A2.4) always holds for a linear production 
function. Thus, the per-period total cost  ( , , , ) ( ( , )) ( , )
t t t t t t t t
r r r r TC X Y x y D f X Y C x y = +  is convex in 
its arguments. If a sequence { }
1 1
0 *, *, ,
t t t t
r r t x y X Y
∞ + +
=  that satisfies the first-order conditions (16) to 
(19) and ( , ) (0,0) r r x y
∗ ∗ >  exists, then it is the optimal solution to problem (14). □    
 
Proposition 3 
The first-order conditions for the steady state can be expressed as  
0 X A δλ − − =                    (A3.2) 
0 Y B δλ − − =                    (A3.3) 
( ) ( )
1 exp 1 X X X z X Y d
α β α δλ λ
− − + − =             (A3.4) 
( )
1 exp (1 ) Y Y Y z X Y d
α β β δλ λ
− − + − = .            (A3.5) 
These first-order conditions imply that 
( )
( )
1 1
1 1
X
Y
A d Y
X B d
β δ
α δ
  − −   =
  − −  
.                   (A3.6) 
It  is  clear,  however,  from  the  equimarginality  conditions  (A3.2)  and  (A3.3)  that  the  optimal 
solution will always be a corner solution in this setting. Whenever  
( ) ( )
1 [1 1 ]exp X d z X Y A
α β δ δ α
− − − ≥ ,             (A3.7) 
the optimal  r x  is the maximum admissible rate. Whenever the inequality is reversed, the optimal 
abatement rate equals zero. A similar reasoning holds for pollutant Y. □     38 
Table 1: Parameter values used in the eutrophication example  
Symbol  Value  Sources  
a  52  Redfield et al. (1963) 
b  373  Redfield et al. (1963) 
x d   0.5  Neumann  (2000); Savchuk and Wulff  (1999) 
y d   0.2  Kiirikki et al. (2006) 
0 x   34 586  t  Helin  et  al.  (2006),  Kiirikki  et  al.  (2003),  and  personal 
communication, Heikki Pitkänen, Finnish Environment Institute. 
0 y   1 514 t  Helin  et  al.  (2006),  Kiirikki  et  al.  (2003),  and  personal 
communication, Heikki Pitkänen, Finnish Environment Institute. 
0 X   40 000 t  Laukkanen  and  Huhtala  (2008),  and  personal  communication, 
Heikki Pitkänen and Pirjo Rantanen, Finnish Environment Institute. 
0 Y   6 000 t  Laukkanen  and  Huhtala  (2008),  and  personal  communication, 
Heikki Pitkänen and Pirjo Rantanen, Finnish Environment Institute. 
A  1.86 €/t
2  Helin et al. (2006) 
B  4460 €/t  Vodokanal (2005) 
q  0.45  Vodokanal (2005) 
x   4 518 t  Vodokanal (2005) 
E  -170190  Laukkanen and Huhtala (2008) (recalibrated) 
F  -1536900  Laukkanen and Huhtala (2008) (recalibrated) 
G  179200  Laukkanen and Huhtala (2008) (recalibrated) 
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Table 2: Total cost saving, damage costs and abatement costs of alternative abatement strategies 
in the eutrophication example 
Abatement strategy  
Total cost saving  
(NPV, billion €) 
Damage costs 
(NPV, quadrillion €) 
Abatement costs  
(NPV, quadrillion €) 
Optimal P abatement   101.8  877.4  4 552.1 
Optimal N abatement   95.2  44 574.7  214 290.5 
50% reduction of both  92.3  111.0  362 395.9 
Business as usual  0  6 286 079.5  0 
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Table 3: Parameter values used in the climate change example  
Symbol  Value  Sources   Symbol  Value  Sources  
1 α   5.35  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
1 A   0.60  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
2 α   1.69  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
2 A   61.18  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
3 α   0.12  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
3 A   0.46  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
4 α   0.52  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
4 A   0.0038  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
ϕ  0.980  Tol (2006) 
1 β   0.35  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
γ   0.00458  Tol (2006) recalibrated 
2 β   0.23  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
1 τ   20  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
3 β   0.12  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
2 τ   12  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
4 β   0.17  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
3 τ   120  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
1 θ   -0.167  Fisher and Narain (2003) 
4 τ   3200  Aaheim et al. (2006) 
2 θ   0.467  Fisher and Narain (2003) 
ψ   0.3  Aaheim et al. (2006)       
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Figure 1: Total cost saving of alternative abatement strategies during the first 40 years (in net 
present value terms).   42 
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Figure 2: Changes in the stocks of greenhouse gases under the optimal abatement policy   43 
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Figure 3: Increase in global temperature (in degrees Celsius) relative to the temperature level in 
the year 2000 in the “business as usual” (BAU) and optimal abatement scenarios  
  ISSN 1795-5300
MTT Discussion Papers 5 • 2009 MTT Discussion Papers 5 • 2009
(In)Efﬁ  cient 
Management of Interacting
 Environmental Bads
Timo Kuosmanen & Marita Laukkanen